

REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY OF BUDDHIST LOGIC

These reflections will deal with I. Types of texts, II. Order of chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, III. Some passages from these texts. Since there are innumerable passages that could be selected, it should be clarified that the passages are mainly from the three texts of my current research as mentioned below. The passages are presumably of general interest and are discussed under the headings, 1. Words for set and category in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, 2. About the « inaccessible », 3. Color and shape, 4. *Svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa* and the *ākāra* theory, 5. The three examinations and *antarvyāpti*.

I. Types of texts

My current research in Buddhist logic came about through finishing a translation of a Tibetan work which contains a considerable amount of Mādhyamika-type logic. In the course of this labor I resorted to another and brief treatise by this author, Tsoṅ-kha-pa (1357-1419), « A guided tour through the seven books of Dharmakīrti », and have recently translated this from the original Tibetan². I have also edited and translated the entire Sanskrit for Asaṅga's « Rules of Debate », of about 400 A.D.³ These two texts are almost exactly a millennium apart. It dawned on me that these two had a certain limitation of being self-contained, i.e. written without any effort to bring into consideration

1. *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, translated from the Tibetan of Tsoṅ-kha-pa's *Lam rim chen mo* (forthcoming, Columbia University Press).

2. This is the *Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel zes bya ba* Sarnath, 1969.

3. Once I gave a sketch of the Sanskrit in « The rules of debate according to Asaṅga », *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 78:1, 1958, pp. 29-40, aided by G. Tucci's article on early Buddhist logic in *JRAS*, 1929, pp. 451-488.

other schools of Buddhism or non-Buddhist theories. While in Japan in Fall 1976 surveying texts in the logic section of the Tibetan Tanjur, I came across a little work of Kamalaśīla's, the *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣa-saṃkṣipti*, of completely different character because it claims to give adversary views (*pūrvapakṣa*) to Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*. In Dec. 1976, during a stay in Darbhanga, Bihar, India, I made a draft translation of this, and have been subsequently correcting the draft.

Now, Asaṅga's little treatise on « Rules of Debate » (*hetuvidyā*) shows logic in its debate context, just as is the case in the celebrated medical text *Carakasamhitā*⁴. The one by Tsoṅ-kha-pa is given over to the main terms, varieties, and examples, of Buddhist logic, seemingly divorced from the old debate context. While these two texts certainly contrast in this manner, they have more in common in the sense of their function or aim, which is to use logic, not for its own sake as would a professional logician, but as a tool for the arguing of doctrinal points. In short, the « Guided Tour » is of this type because it represents what one should know for arguing in the Mādhyamika sections, as do Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka, and as Tsoṅ-kha-pa does in the « Discerning the Real » section devoted to establishing the Mādhyamika view. In contrast, Kamalaśīla's little work affiliated with his *Pañjikā* on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*, is of quite different nature, since it uses logic for engaging a wide variety of adversaries, both Buddhist and non Buddhist, and is in the tradition of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, which is written throughout with expressed or implied contact with the *pūrvapakṣa* (the opponent).

Stcherbatsky in his *Buddhist Logic*⁵ sets forth a theory that commentaries on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* accessible in Tibetan translation (in the Tanjur) are of three types, and that two of these have been continued in native Tibetan commentarial tradition, according to the following schema:

<i>Type of commentary</i>	<i>Indian commentator</i>	<i>Tibetan continuator</i>
philological	Devendrabuddhi Śākyabuddhi	Mkhas-grub-rje, etc.
philosophic	Dharmottara	Rgyal-tshab, etc.
religious	Prajñākaragupta	—

This is a suggestive division, and my previous observations are partially in agreement, since it is clear that one can place Asaṅga's and Tsoṅ-kha-pa's little treatises in the philological category, as constituting

4. SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1932, II, 373-392.

5. TH. STCHERBATSKY, *Buddhist Logic*, two vols., Dover ed., 1962, I, pp. 39-47.

outline or survey-type works meant for the beginner who wishes to get a grounding in the topic for its own sake or for use in doctrinal arguments. Kamalaśīla's work is to be placed in the philosophic category, since it defends the position of Buddhist logic against its detractors.

I found further confirmation of Stcherbatsky's attributions to these categories when examining some smaller Tanjur works of Dharmottara (he is more noted for his important commentaries on Dharmakīrti's works), namely, the two *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* as well as the *Anyāpoha-nāmaprakaraṇa*. In these works he not only clarifies certain fundamental problems of the object of logical authority (*pramāṇa*), these objects being called generally the *viśaya* or *prameya*, but also clarifies the Yogācāra affiliation of the Buddhist logician. These works certainly belong to the « philosophic » category. As to the Tibetan commentator Rgyal-tshab-rje being placed in the same line, during my Dharmasala visit in Feb. 1977, I learned that the Buddhist dialectics school there has Buddhist logic as one of the topics of the curriculum, with the *Pramāṇavārttika* as the basic text, and Rgyal-tshab-rje's native Tibetan commentary as the stipulated commentary. Inquiring why Mkhas-grub-rje's commentary was not employed I was told that in the Gelugpa sect Rgyal-tshab-rje is considered to exhibit a command of Buddhist philosophy in his logic commentaries, while Mkhas-grub-rje is rather considered an authority in the Tantras. This is also consistent with the first line of the schema where Mkhas-grub-rje is said to continue the philological type of commentary. Malvania⁶ mentions that the commentator Vinītadeva also belongs to this category; and it is of interest to note that Vinītadeva's chief works are in the Vinaya (disciplinary code of Buddhism), including his large *Vinaya-vibhaṅga-pada-vyākhyāna*. Again, there is the story that Dharmakīrti's own disciple Devendrabuddhi did not do justice to the master's works⁷. But this simply amounts to saying that Devendrabuddhi only has a command of the terms, their varieties, definitions, and examples, to which the non-professional logician is limited. Besides, there is the well-known work *Nyāyapraveśa* which was once attributed to Dignāga, but now known to have been composed by Śaṅkarasvāmin, said to have been a disciple of Dignāga. Tachikawa⁸, introducing his translation, makes the significant observation that Śaṅkarasvāmin « composed the *Nyāyapraveśa* as an introduction to Dignāga's doctrine ». This treatise is of the same type as Tsoṅ-kha-pa's « Guided Tour », i.e. composed of the basic terms of the system, with their varieties, e.g. « X is of two kinds », and example, hence belongs to the « philological » class. But it may well belong there in the sense

6. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, ed., DURVEKA MĪŚRA's, *Dharmottarapradīpa*, Patna, 1971, Introduction, p. XX.

7. STCHERBATSKY, I, p. 38, reports this from Tārānātha.

8. MUSASHI TACHIKAWA, « A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic (A Translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*) », *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, I, 1971, 111-145.

of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* itself — a « philological » type work written for beginners by a professional logician whose chief works are in the « philosophic » category.

But then, what about Stcherbatsky's third category — the « religious », exemplified by Prajñākaragupta, with no Tibetan continuator? We can get an indication from his work, the *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*. A. S. Altekar evaluates this commentary in his introduction to the edition (pp. viii-ix)⁹: « It is, however, much more than a verbal or even an ordinary commentary. Prajñākaragupta not only clarifies the theories and views of Dharmakīrti, but also throws a fresh and welcome light upon them. He also discusses related matters showing his deep scholarship ». Besides, Prajñākaragupta's commentary is on the three chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* called *Pramāṇasiddhi*, *Pratyakṣa*, and *Parārthānumāna*, leaving out the *Svārthānumāna* chapter. Now, Dharmakīrti himself commented only on his *Svārthānumāna* chapter. We must conclude that Prajñākaragupta's intention was to write a philosophical commentary on the very three chapters on which Dharmakīrti had not himself written a philosophical commentary. Hence, Prajñākaragupta is also to be placed among the philosophical commentators; and we note that Gnoli¹⁰ places him in this category. We surmise the reason Stcherbatsky found no Tibetan continuator was that in fact there was no third category. I suppose the works and commentaries were of two kinds, either the philological variety for beginners and for a smattering of this logic by persons who were studying it principally to use it in the discussion of doctrinal points; or else the philosophical variety for advanced students of this logic and to defend the system of logic from its opponents.

II. Order of chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika*

It is well known that of the four chapters of *Pramāṇavārttika* mentioned above, there is a difference in the order between the Sanskrit edition available with Manorathanandin's commentary and the Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇavārttika*¹¹. The Sanskrit edition order is: *Pramāṇasiddhi*, *Pratyakṣa*, *Svārthānumāna*, *Parārthānumāna*. The Tibe-

9. RĀHULA SĀṆKRITYĀYANA, *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*, Patna, 1953.

10. RANIERO GNOLI, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti; the First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, Roma, 1960, Introduction, p. XXIII.

11. For the Sanskrit I employ the convenient edition by Dwarikadas Shastri, published Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1968; for the Tibetan of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, the edition of Sarnath, 1974; and also Yūsho Miyasaka, ed., *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan), *Acta Indologica* II, Naritasan Shinshoji, 1971/72; and Y. MIYASAKA, *An Index to the Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit to Tibetan), *Acta Indologica* III, 1973-1975.

tan order is: Svārthānumāna, Pramāṇasiddhi, Pratyakṣa, Parārthānumāna. The two independent Sanskrit editors of Dharmakīrti's autocommentary on the Svārthānumāna chapter have advanced reasons for the rival order. Thus Malvania¹² shows that the Sanskrit text order of the chapters follows the theory that the work is a kind of commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Dignāga's chapters followed the order, Pratyakṣaparīkṣā, Svārthānumāna, Parārthānumāna, Dṛṣṭāntaparīkṣā, Apohaparīkṣā, Jātiparīkṣā. Dharmakīrti did not assign individual chapters to the last three topics, Dṛṣṭāntaparīkṣā, etc. but treats these topics here and there in his four chapters. Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter is just an extended exposition of the first *kārikā* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Hence, acceptance of the Sanskrit text order in an admittance that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is basically a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Malvania goes on to point out that when Dharmakīrti wrote his autocommentary solely on the Svārthānumāna chapter, there he used future terms (e.g. *vakṣyāmaḥ*, « we shall tell ») to refer to topics in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* and *Pratyakṣa* chapters, which proves the priority in Dharmakīrti's mind of the Svārthānumāna chapter to the *Pramāṇasiddhi* and *Pratyakṣa* chapters. Gnoli¹³ mentions the commentators on both sides of the argument, and himself concludes that the frequent use of the future terms in Dharmakīrti's autocommentary proves the Svārthānumāna to have been originally the first chapter¹⁴.

Dge-'dun-grub (also called the First Dalai Lama) states in his Tibetan commentary¹⁵ on the Svārthānumāna chapter that the first three chapters are for comprehending the object (*prameya*) of the authority (*pramāṇa*), to wit, the chapter Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own sake) clarifies what is beyond sight (*lkog gyur*, S. *parokṣa*) — hence what has to be inferred; the chapter *Pramāṇasiddhi* (success of the authority) clarifies the path to liberation; and the chapter *Pratyakṣa* (direct perception) clarifies what is directly realized (*sākṣāt*). Then chapter 4, *Parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of others) deals with the syllogisms that generate that (comprehension of object) in others. He also gives some technical reasons for the priority of the given chapter 1, mentioning that Svārthānumāna establishes what is a faulty reflection in

12. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, ed., *Svārthānumāna-pariccheda by Dharmakīrti*, Varanasi, 1959, Introduction, p. 4.

13. R. GNOLI, *The Pramāṇavārttikam*, pp. XV-XVI.

14. MASATACHI NAGATOMI, « The Framework of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Book I », *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 79:4, Oct.-Dec., 1959, p. 263, note, shows his awareness of the argument that has advanced the Svārthānumāna chapter to no. 1, pushing the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter (which he translated as a doctoral dissertation) down to no. 2; but himself keeps the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter as no. 1 on the strength of its position as no. 1 in the Sanskrit texts.

15. *Tshad ma rnam 'grel legs par bśad pa žes bya ba thams cad mkhyen pa Dge-'dun-grub kyis mdzad pa las ran don rjes su dpag pa'i lehu'i rnam bśad*, Sarnath, 1968.

discriminating the right and wrong meaning (*don*, S. *ārtha*). Gnoli¹⁶ also notices this reason, as does Malvania¹⁷.

On the other hand, if we take into consideration the two types of logic texts as set forth in our preceding section, there appears to be some justification for the Sanskrit text order of chapters. That is, looking into what is chapter 1 in this ordering (*Pramāṇasiddhi*), one finds a stress from the first on the « non-deceptiveness » (*avisaṃvāda*), e.g. « Authority is a non-deceptive cognition »¹⁸. This is necessary for establishing the Buddhist doctrine as a topic of inference, but having non-deceptive authority, since the Buddha is the authority (*pramāṇa*). The chapter goes into traditional teachings of things to accept or to reject, also suffering, impermanence, doubts, and the like; getting rid of egoistic views, and the path leading to the « exchange of basis » (*āśraya-parivṛtti*) as in Yogācāra philosophy. It contains a passage which Tson-kha-pa twice quotes in his *Lam rim chen mo*, from verse 134¹⁹: « Since the goal (*upeya*) [i.e. the ending of suffering] and its cause [i.e. the path, *mārga*] are beyond sight, it is difficult to explain them ». It is clear that Dharmakīrti exhibits certain elements of the logic system, and that this chapter is intended for doctrinal or didactic use. This signals the practical end of logic as a profane subject, traditionally included among the outer sciences along with medicine, grammar, and so on. And while logic, under the rubric *hetuvidyā* would continue to be formally included in the outer sciences, it came to be treated as a subject to be studied by the monks with the same diligence and devotion as was applied to the other topics of « inner science », Abhidharma, Prajñāpāramitā, and Vinaya²⁰. Then the remaining three chapters in the Sanskrit order, the Pratyakṣa, Svārthānumāna, and Parārthānumāna chapters, continue the divisions established by Dharmakīrti's great predecessor Dignāga, and so must be counted as the professional logician's portion of the *Pramāṇa-vārttika* in the « philosophic » category.

Continuing the defense of the Sanskrit order, we note that the very first verse of the Pratyakṣa chapter states that there are two kinds of authority (*pramāṇa*) because there are two kinds of objects (*prameya*) — namely, efficient or non-efficient. Thus Dharmakīrti promptly alludes to the two authorities, direct perception and inference, saying they are established by reason of diverse objects: the direct perception by its efficient object, the *svalakṣaṇa* (frequently translated the « individual »); and the inference by its non-efficient object, the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (fre-

16. R. GNOLI, *The Pramāṇavārttikam*, p. XVII.

17. Malvania, ed., *Svārthānumāna*, Introduction, p. 5.

18. *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam*, Shastri, ed., *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 3.

19. *parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānam hi duṣkaram*.

20. STCHERBATSKY, *Ruddhist Logic*, I, p. 46, points out that while the Gelugpa sect accepts strong religious value in Dharmakīrti's logic system, the Sa-skya paṇḍita, among others, maintained that Dharmakīrti's works did not change the situation that logic is a profane science.

quently translated the « universal »). Throughout this chapter, Dharmakīrti shows in various subtle ways the difference between direct perception and inference, especially in terms of their respective objects. It is clear enough from the content of this *Pratyakṣa* chapter that it should precede the two inference chapters. Granted though, that the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti teaching that a *pratyakṣa* always precedes an *anumāna*, is not itself an evidence for the order of chapters.

Also there is a clue from Tsoñ-kha-pa's « Guided Tour » as to why Dharmakīrti wrote an auto-commentary on the « Inference for one's own saks » but not on the « Inference for the sake of others » chapter. This is in the fact that in the discussion of this latter topic, there is much mention of Dignāga's position, but no such mention in Tsoñ-kha-pa's preceding discussion (« for one's own sake »). This suggests that in the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti the most troublesome controversy was about the « Inference for one's own sake » while the « Inference for the sake of others » was taken over from Dignāga more routinely. Hattori says²¹: « Dignāga is probably the first to distinguish between inference for one's own sake and inference for the sake of others ». One may suppose that Dharmakīrti was forced to write an autocommentary on the « Inference for one's own sake » (the *Svārthānumāna*) to support the various modifications he had to make in Dignāga's prior treatment of this topic as well as to rationalize such theories as the *apoha* to make them more impregnable to adversary assaults.

The point could be raised: How about the *Pratyakṣa* chapter? In reply, while some scholars, ancient and modern, have claimed that Dharmakīrti modified Dignāga's position on *pratyakṣa*, even allowing this to be a fair charge, it still would involve attitudes *after* the time of Dharmakīrti toward Dharmakīrti, and would not be necessarily relevant to the problem of why he wrote an autocommentary on one chapter and not on others, since this involves considerations of what had happened *prior to* and *contemporary to* Dharmakīrti. Even so, on a certain aspect of this problem I have written a paper « A reconsideration of Dharmakīrti's "deviation" from Dignāga on *pratyakṣābhāsa* »²².

If one wishes definitely to support the Sanskrit text order, he would have to explain away somehow the future term-reference which both Gnoli and Malvania have noticed. Gnoli himself allows²³, « Strictly speaking, indeed, these references may have been added by Dharmakīrti himself later ». But if it is cogent to make such an observation, one could just as well say that these references may have been added by a

21. MASAOKI HATTORI, *Dignāga, On Perception*, Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 12.

22. Forthcoming, Diamond Jubilee issue, *Journal of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*.

23. R. GNOLI, *The Pramāṇavārttikam*, p. XVII.

later author to justify the Svārthanumāna as the first chapter.

Also, one may understand the Tibetan text ordering from a certain standpoint. In Tibet, there was much reliance on the commentaries, because the basic works were so often written in the most concise form, and in verse for memorial purposes. Since the « Inference for one's own sake » was the only chapter of this, Dharmakīrti's greatest work, to have the master's own commentary, it could assume an importance to the Tibetans to the extent that this chapter would be studied first; although naturally other reasons would have to be advanced for the particular chapter order.

If one wishes definitely to support the order in the Tibetan Tanjur against the Sanskrit text order, he would probably also have to conclude that this was Dharmakīrti's way of announcing that his *Pramāṇavārttika* really was *not* a commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

III. Some passages from these texts

1. Words for set and category in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

a) *dharmatā*, in the meaning « underlying nature », as forming a « metaphysical » set — a set of dharmas not obviously related. So in the « Rules of Debate » section²⁴:

What is the inference from a (class) nature? The inferring of the underlying nature (*dharmatā*) of its association from the associated *dharma* that is not obviously related. For example, one infers the state of suffering (*duḥkhatā*) from one (i.e. *dharma*) associated with impermanence. One infers voidness and non-self from one associated with suffering; (infers) the underlying nature of old age from one associated with birth, etc. etc.

That is to say, when Buddhism explains the Truth of Suffering by the characters, suffering, impermanence, voidness, and non-self, these, suffering, impermanence, etc. constitute an underlying nature that is a metaphysical set to associate seemingly unrelated natures (*dharma*).

b) *ity-evam-bhāgīya*, « whatever (else) agrees with this », as forming a given set of elements obviously related. This expression occurs near the end of the foregoing passage, near the end of various other passages in the « Rules of Debate », and innumerable times elsewhere in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

c) *pakṣa*, « category ». So in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*²⁵:

24. Bihar manuscript: dharmato 'numāṇaṃ katamat / yan nānuśiṣṭeṇa dharmasambaddhena tatsambandha [dharmatā] bhyūhanam / tadyathā 'nityasambaddhena duḥkhatām anumīnoti / duḥkhasambaddhena śūnyatā [nā] tmatām jātisambaddhena jarādharmaṭām... anumīnoti /...

25. A. WAYMAN, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript*, Berkeley, 1961, p. 108.

A single area of thought is of calming category and of discerning category. Among those, when there is fixation of thought of nine kinds, this is of the calming category; and when there is usage of insight of four kinds, this is of the discerning category.

But nowhere in Asaṅga's « Rules of Debate » or elsewhere in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in which I have done much reading over the years, have I found anything to suggest that he would regard setting up such sets or categories to introduce any error. In his « Rules of Debate » he states, as is later emphasized by Dharmakīrti, that « direct perception » — which contrasts with « inference » — is non-delusory (*avibrānta*); but does not, as does Dharmakīrti, when defining « inference » (*anumāna*), say it is delusory (*vibhrānta*).

2. About the « inaccessible ».

To show how a passage of Asaṅga's « Rules of Debate » is changed in context in the Dharmakīrti literature as in Tsoṅ-kha-pa's « Guided Tour », the passage about the « inaccessible » is chosen for its special interest. Asaṅga includes the passage under his treatment of « direct perception » (*pratyakṣa*). Among other things, « direct perception » is the « not out-of-sight », and it is of four aspects, including, « because of accessibility (*aviprakaṣa*) ». When the author comes to treat this aspect, it turns out that accessibility is understood by way of inaccessibility; and there are three kinds: — inaccessibility of place (*deśaviprakaṣa*), inaccessibility of time (*kālaviprakaṣa*), and inaccessibility through metaphysical nature (*apacaya*²⁶-*viprakaṣa*).

When we pass to the « Guided Tour » (a millennium later »), we find the treatment is not under the heading of « direct perception » but under the separate treatment of the object (*viśaya*) of authority, there being in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system two and only two authorities, as previously mentioned, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. Now it may happen that an object cannot be determined or ascertained, i.e. has no feasibility of being the object of an authority, in which case it is said to be « inaccessible » (*viprakṣṭa*). In the « Guided Tour » one may have three kinds of inaccessibility: — a) inaccessibility of place, e.g. a man's layout (T. *sdod lugs*) placed in a different house; b) inaccessibility of time, e.g. a man's layout tomorrow in this spot; c) inaccessibility of intrinsic nature, e.g. a demonic spirit in a spot in front. It is this last example, that of the spirit in front, that forces the term *viprakṣṭa* to be translated as « inaccessible » rather than by one of the dictionary's entries, « remote ».

26. The rendition « metaphysical nature » for *apacaya* is my suggestion for this difficult term on the basis of its definition in FRANKLIN EDGERTON, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary*, and the presumed equivalence to the third type of inaccessibility in the « Guided Tour » statement, below.

Given the preceding we may appreciate Dharmakīrti's passage in *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, verses 34-35, for which the commentary says they show the Lord (*bhagavat*) as the authority (*pramāṇa*) because he makes known what one should accept and what one should reject. The verses go ²⁷:

Yonder one, wished for as authority is who makes known the reality of accepting (e.g. truth of suffering) and rejecting (e.g. cause of suffering) along with the means (*upāya*). But he does not make known everything. May one see afar, or else not! But may he see the sought reality! If the one who sees far-off were the authority, we should sit in devotion to the vultures from there.

Dharmakīrti here refers to the non-authority for objects that cannot be determined, by virtue of inaccessibility. There are always the people who set themselves up as authorities for the inaccessible. But, says Dharmakīrti, if we admit authorities for objects that cannot be ascertained by virtue of inaccessibility, we may as well put our trust in the vultures, who can locate the far-off corpses. Some persons would retort: When we speak of spiritual matters, this purblind fellow Dharmakīrti compares us to vultures! To which we can hear Dharmakīrti replying: As a matter of fact, yonder vultures are able to detect the far-off corpses which are inaccessible to our sight. We can admit that without accepting vultures as our authority. Yonder Buddha is the authority for what one should accept or reject within the scope of direct perception or inference. Thus the Blessed One established religion within the scope of our feasible acts of body, speech, and mind. You, sir, would have us believe that some realm of spirit, while inaccessible to us, by some mystery is accessible to you! If it is accessible to you — fine! And still you would not be our authority.

3. *Color and shape.*

We may observe about the preceding example of the three kinds of inaccessibility drawn from philological type works (the « Rules of Debate » and the « Guided Tour »), that this could be grasped conceptually upon the hearing or reading. Dharmakīrti's verses are also readily comprehensible if one has paid attention to the sequence of doctrinal statements in that chapter (the *Pramāṇasiddhi*). But in the case of the philosophical passage to be cited now, one does not get the meaning just by hearing or by a single reading, for one must think it over. This is from Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*, which was already included in the philosophical group. He is speaking about the object of direct per-

27. heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ /
yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ //
dūraṃ paśyatu vā mā vā tattvam iṣṭam tu paśyatu /
pramāṇam dūradarśo ced eta gṛhṛān upāsmahe //

ception — the efficient entity ²⁸:

Of those, the efficient entity is the subtle atom, and color (*varṇa*) is the nature of the subtle atom, but shape (*saṃsthāna*) is not. Thus, shape exists conventionally (*saṃvṛtita*) while color exists in the absolute sense (*paramārthataḥ*). The latter serves for an effect while shape does not. Consequently, while one ordinarily sees something efficient as a multiple, when one understands the nature of this and that, it is not distinct, for example, a moment. [It is objected:] « Shape is that way. Its existence in a distinct manner pervades as an adjunct to an entity in the sense of a distinct configuration. Just as in the absence of a thesis there is no reason, it would contradict this were the adjunct to an object (*viśaya*) without distinctness ». Now we have explained that shape is not an adjunct. Therefore, the shape, or the « state of a given thing » (*dños po ñid*, S. *vastutva*), or a moment, are dependent on something, whatever the something else.

The objector cited in the passage had introduced the theory of pervasion (*vyāpti*) or a necessary connection (*avinābhāva*). He said that one cannot imagine a color without a shape, just as one cannot imagine a reason (saying, « because... ») without a thesis (for which one says « because »). Notice that both the thesis and the reason are verbal. Likewise there is no smoke without fire. Notice that both the smoke and the fire are external things. But Dharmottara replies that these are fallacious examples. One can hear a thesis and much later the reason: one can see fire over there, and separately billows of smoke. But whoever saw a color here and the shape over there? Or now the color and later the shape? Dharmottara says that the color is really there, and direct perception is, e.g. of blue, and this blue is efficient; while the shape is only imagined conventionally, and this shape is not efficient — it is a construction of the mind and not an adjunct to the color. Thus of the two parts, the color and the shape, one is external and real, the other mental — sheer discursive thought (*kalpanā*).

Since this is a philosophical passage, it should help us in determining the philosophical affiliation. Harivarman's *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, a third cen-

28. Japanese photo ed. of Tibetan canon (PTT), Vol. 138, p. 63-2-1: / de dag gi don byed nus pa'i don ni rdul phra rab ñid yin la rdul pra rab kyi rañ bzin yañ kha dog ñid yin gi / dbyibs ni ma yin no / des na dbyibs ni kun rdzob tu yod pa yin la / kha dog ni don dam par yod pa yin no / 'bras bu la ñe bar mkho ba yañ de ñid yin gyi dbyibs ni ma yin no / de'i phyir gañ zig don byed pa du ma'i thun moñ du de mthoñ ba na de de'i rañ bzin du rtogs pa de ni tha dad pa mia yin te / dper na skad cig ñid ma. bzin no / dbyibs kyañ de bzin no / tha dad par yod pa ni rnam par tha dad par don la ñe bar sbyor bas khyab pa yin te / des khas mi len na rgyu mtshan med pa'i phyir ro / de dañ 'gal ba ni tha dad pa med par yul la ñe bar sbyor ba yin no / dbyibs ni ñe bar sbyor ba med pa yin no zes bsad zin to / de'i phyir dbyibs sam dños po ñid dam / skad cig ma'am / gzan gyi dhañ du gyur pa gzan yañ ruñ ste /.

tury, A.D. work, has been translated by N. Aiyaswami Sastri back into Sanskrit from Chinese²⁹. Sastri (pp. 542-43) cites the Buddhist logicians on this point to show that they agree with Harivarman « that the colours, etc. are real entities and the shape of length and breadth, etc. are nominal and that the knowledge of colour, etc. is right, *samyak* ». In his Liebhenthal Festschrift article Sastri says³⁰: « According to the Sautrāntikas the combined form of the four great elements have only a conventional existence (*prajñaptisat*) ». This is consistent with the frequent association of the Buddhist logicians with the Sautrāntikas as in the type of Tibetan treatise called *Grub mtha'* (S. *Siddhānta*), which characteristically deal with the four « theory systems » (*siddhānta*) of Buddhism, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika. Here it is the combined forms of the atoms that is imagined, while the individual atoms are not imagined: they are real and are perceived as color. Besides, there is the usual assumed affiliation of the Buddhist logicians with the Buddhist Yogācāra school³¹. But here there has been considerable confusion in books that have come to my notice, by failure to distinguish rival traditions of Yogācāra. In terms of texts, one may distinguish four kinds of Yogācāra:

a) Asaṅga's school of *Yogācārabhūmi* based on the *Samādhinirmocana-sūtra*.

b) The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*.

c) The *Madhyāntavibhāga* attributed to Maitreya, with commentary of Vasubandhu, subcommentary of Sthiramati.

d) Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*, with exegesis in Hsüan-tsang's *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*.

Of these, the *Yogācārabhūmi* contains the « Rules of Debate », representing the earlier school of Buddhist logic which Dignāga thoroughly reformed. The Yogācāra position of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* went along with the « Heart Sūtra » of Prajñāpāramitā literature as adopted by followers of Ch'an Buddhism in China.

The *Madhyāntavibhāga* and the two Vasubandhu treatises are the best candidates for affiliation with the Buddhist logicians. Indeed, Vinītadeva, who comments in the philologic manner on various Dharmakīrti books, has written the commentaries *Prakaraṇa-viṃśaka-ṭīkā* and the *Triṃśikā-ṭīkā*, preserved in the Tibetan canon, on the Vasubandhu treatises, suggesting he thinks the Yogācāra called Vijñaptimātra (« representation only ») is relevant.

29. Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 159, the Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1975.

30. Kwei-chi's Note on Ālambana (Object-Cause), *Sino-Indian Studies; Liebhenthal Festschrift*, Santiniketan, 1937, p. 1.

31. For example, CHHOTÉ LAL TRIPATHI, *The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism*, Varanasi, 1972, occupies most of the space with considerations of the Buddhist logicians.

However, the *Madhyāntavibhāga* Yogācāra is probably the most likely one to have been affiliated with these logicians. Dharmottara's passage about color and shape, thus defending the theory of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school, and going back to the still earlier Harivarman system — reminds me of my old review article on « The Yogācāra Idealism »³². Here I pointed out that the *Madhyāntavibhāga* has two distinct « reals » (my own word) called « imagination of unreality » (*abhūtaparikalpa*) and « voidness » (*śūnyatā*), where « voidness » turns out to be the pure, objective *dharmadhātu*; and that these two are inseparable. This is equivalent to saying that one cannot conceive a form (read: « shape ») without a content (read: « color »), where the « imagination of unreality » provides the form, and the « void *dharmadhātu* » provides the content. According to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school, perception (*pratyakṣa*) must have its object, the *svalakṣaṇa* referred to as « color », and by me now as the « content », before inference (*anumāna*) can have its object, the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* referred to as « shape », and by me now as the « form ». Thus, the insistence by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* constitute two distinct authorities (*pramāṇa*), although the object of *pratyakṣa* is real (referred to as *paramārtha-sat*), while the object of *anumāna* consists of discursive thought (and is accompanied according to Dharmakīrti with delusion, *bhrānti*) — agrees with the two principles of the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. The priority of the content to the form is equivalent to saying, as I did in that review article, that clay is always clay and sometimes is a pot if a potter puts his mind to it.

4. *Svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa and the ākāra theory.*

In the preceding section, it was suggested that Asaṅga's type of Yogācāra is not the philosophical base of the Buddhist logicians. To show this, requires a discussion of Dignāga's four kinds of *pratyakṣa* and also the mutually rival theories called *sākāra* (with imagery) and *nirākāra* (without imagery). Also here I shall use some of the Tibetan *Grub mtha'* (Siddhānta) books. Of the four kinds of « direct perception », namely, of senses (*indriya*), of the mind (*mānasa*), of introspection (*svasaṃvedana*), and of the yogin (*yogi*), especially the varieties « of the mind » and « of introspection » occasioned numerous arguments of the Buddhist logicians, not only with the Hindu and Jaina philosophers, but also with other Buddhist thinkers, in particular the Yogācārin followers of Asaṅga's school.

The Tibetan author Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbañ-po, in his brief *Grub mtha'* work³³, divides the Yogācārin (*sems tsam pa*) into two: those who follow scripture (*āgama-anusārin*), and those who follow reason

32. *Philosophy East and West*, XV:1, Jan., 1965, pp. 65-73.

33. *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bžag pa rin po che'i phreñ ba*, Dha-sa-sés-rig press, India, 1967, p. 49.

(*yuktyanusārin*). The former are those who follow the five divisions of Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi*. The latter are those who follow the seven treatises of logic (by Dharmakīrti). (According to Tibetan tradition, there are three main ones — *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and *Nyāyabindu*; and four ancillary ones — *Hetubindu*, *Vādanyāya*, *Sambandhaparīkṣa*, and *Samtānāntarasiddhi*). Worthy of note is the difference attributed to the two regarding their theory of the « subjective » (*viśayin*): « The followers of scripture accept the *ālayavijñāna* as the personality (*pudgala*) because they believe in the eight kinds of *vijñāna*. The followers of reason believe in the *mano-vijñāna* as the basic characteristic of the personality ». I suppose this insistence is bound up with the Buddhist logician theory of Apoha, which defines a given thing such as a cow by the exclusion of everything that is not it. But this theory only appears plausible with a unity theory of *manas*, meaning that the mind can only entertain one thing at a time, even if it promptly passes to something else.

In the medium-length *Grub mtha'* composed by Lcañ-skyā Rol-pa'i-rdo-rje we read³⁴: « The Yogācārins who follow reason accept the four kinds of direct perception, to wit, of the five senses, of the mind, of introspection, and of the yogin. The Yogācārins who follow scripture reject the belief in introspection, and of the yogin. The Yogācārins who follow scripture reject the belief in introspection while accepting the other three kinds; but since this was not clarified, the Venerable 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje explained that the introspection kind is not believed in by Yogācārins who follow the five *bhūmi* divisions because it was not set forth in the five *bhūmi* divisions. Even so, that the Yogācārins who follow scripture are pervaded by disbelief in introspection is not accepted by that Venerable one himself, because he himself explained that there are Yogācārins who believe in both the *ālaya* (*-vijñāna*) and introspection, because he said in the *Grub mtha' chen mo* that verily the *ālayavijñāna* is only experienced in introspection; but by its power and by discursive thought, the two — superimposition and by it the superimposed, as apprehender and apprehended — are false, while when those are not two, there is no falsehood ».

34. *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzag pa gsal bar bzad pa thub bsten lhun po'i mdzes rgyan zhes bya ba las sde tshan*, Sarnath, 1970, p. 193: / rigs pa'i rjes 'brañ gi sems tsam pas mñon sum la dbaṅ yid rañ rig rnal 'byor mñon sum bzī 'dod do / luñ gi rjes 'brañ gi sems tsam pas gzan gsum 'dod kyañ rañ rig 'dod mi 'dod ni gsal bar ma bzad la rje btsun dam pa 'Jam dbyaṅs bzad pa'i rdo rjes sa sde'i rjes 'brañ gi sems tsam pas rañ rig mi 'dod de / sa sde lña nas ma bzad pa'i phyir zhes gsuñs so / de lta na'añ luñ gi rjes 'brañ gi sems tsam pa la rañ rig mi 'dod pas khyab pa ni rje btsun de ñid kyī žal gyis mi bzēs te / de ñid kyis kun gzi dañ rañ rig gñis ka 'dod pa'i sems tsam pa yod par bzad pa'i phyir te / grub mtha' chen mor rnam bden pa'i thad du kun gzi'i ño bo rañ rig myoñ bya tsam de'i stobs las byuñ bas rtog pas de dag gzuñ 'dzin du sgro 'dogs kyañ des sgro btags pa ltar gyis gñis ni rdzun yin la / gñis ma yin pa ni rdzun ma yin pa'i phyir ro / zhes gsuñs pa'i phyir ro /.

'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje means regarding the five *bhūmi* divisions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that when Asaṅga discussed this subject in his « Rules of Debate » he said that direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) can be expressed in terms of what has it. There is direct perception belonging to the formal sense organs, five in number; direct perception belonging to mental experience (i.e. of the *manas*); direct perception belonging to the world, which is the first two taken together; direct perception belonging to the purified person, which includes all of the third, worldly, kind, but exclusive of the latter also includes direct perception belonging to the domain of supramundane knowledge. Therefore, Asaṅga's varieties are easily reduced to the three mentioned above.

Furthermore, the above passage suggests that when the Buddhist logicians are said to reject the « store consciousness » (*ālayavijñāna*) part of the *Yogācāra* tenets, there is left to explain in what sense they reject it; and that passage indicates that the rejection is in the form of a replacement, i.e. that the « introspection » kind of direct perception is substituted for the *ālayavijñāna*. They had already replaced the Buddhist « perception » (*vijñāna*) with the term « direct perception » (*pratyakṣa*). The other side of the coin, of course, is that Asaṅga, who defends the *ālayavijñāna*, does not set forth an « introspection » kind of direct perception. But also he lived before the time of Dignāga.

Tsoṅ-kha-pa's « Guided Tour » helps to show the relation with the *sākāra* and *nirākāra* theories. In his work there is the terminology « extroversion » (*paraśaṃvedana*) covering the varieties « of the sense organs » and « of the mind » — because directed toward external objects. These contrast with *svaśaṃvedana*, directed inward. In the « Guided Tour » discussion of the object (*viśaya*) there is a treatment of the diverse manners of taking something as an object. Among these, there is the *pratibhāsa-viśaya* (object recognized by its appearance), which then is accepted as an object to be grasped (*grāhya-viśaya*)³⁵, of two kinds — the object to be grasped by the *paraśaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*, and by the *svaśaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*. The « Guided Tour » explains: « When one fastens upon the external entity as a given thing, there is an imagery (*ākāra*) resembling a feature (*dharma*); for example, when one resorts to the organ of mind, there are the five, form, etc. ». Defining the *svaśaṃvedana-pratyakṣa* the work states: « The characteristic of the introspective direct perception is the imagery which grasps (*grahaṇa*) only on the inner side (of the mind) ». Examples in the text of « imagery » (*ākāra*) are the *blue* (visual) and the mental phrase « Sound is impermanent » (auditory).

Now, Kajiyama has gathered together the important passages on the *sākāra* and *nirākāra* dispute in his work on Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarka-*

35. L. SWILLING, « Some Aspects of Dharmakīrti's Ontology Reconsidered », *Kailash*, III:3, 1975, p. 312, n. 23, calls these the « apparent object » and the « prima facie direct object ».

bhāṣā as well as in a separate article³⁶. He believes that all four schools of Buddhism (meaning the four theory-systems, Siddhānta) can be classified by their position on the dispute: « The Vaibhāṣika is regarded as *nirākāravādin*, while the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavādin are *sākāravādins* ». He is aware that his conclusion is not supported by some of his citations, so from an author Bodhibhadra, « Nirākāra is taught by Ārya Asaṅga and his followers ». Kajiyama writes³⁷, « We are not sure of characteristics of the controversy before Dharmakīrti. In various places of his books, however, Yamaguchi says that Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, etc. represented the *sākāravāda*, and Guṇamati, Sthiramati, etc. the *nirākāravāda*. His opinion seem to be mainly based on the above passage of Bodhibhadra's and Hsiang-chuang's description of various theories of the Vijñānavādins in the *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi* with K'uei-chi's com ». It appears in the light of my study of the « Guided Tour » that Kajiyama's difficulties in sorting out the teachers in accordance with the two theories were due to not realizing what I have now found out, to wit, it was essentially an argument between the followers (Asaṅga, etc.) of the « store-consciousness » (*ālayavijñāna*) theory on the one hand, and the espousers (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, etc.) of the « introspective perception » (*svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*), on the other hand. Indeed, my studies confirm Yamaguchi's conclusions based on the statements of the old commentators. First of all, it is not an argument about the existence of external objects, nor even whether the sense organs and the mind can furnish sense data. In the large *Grub mtha'*³⁸ of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje the author cites Vajragarbha's commentary on the *Hevajratāntra* to associate the four *pratyakṣas* with characteristics as follows: to indicate (i.e. direct perception of the sense organs), to take hold of (or to digest) (i.e. that of the mind, *manas*), to attain (i.e. that of the *yogin*), and to experience (or to understand) (i.e. that of introspection). Thus the theory of introspection's grasping the *ākāra* (imagery) as a reflection of an external feature (*dharma*) and as a *pratyakṣa* doing it without discursive thought (*kalpanā*) and without delusion (*bhrānti*) — so the Buddhist logicians claimed — implies that such grasping and experiencing is always new and for the first time. Asaṅga and his Yogācāra followers deny such an *ākāra* along with the introspection said to grasp it, because they believe the grasping and experiencing is not new, rather it is by dint of the old seeds of the « store consciousness » (*ālayavijñāna*), and it is not without delusion.

36. YUICHI KAJIYAMA, « Controversy between the *sākāra*- and *nirākāra*-vādins of the *yogācāra* school- some materials », *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, University of Tokyo, XIV:1, Dec., 1965, pp. 26-37; *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy; an Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta*, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10, 1966, pp. 154-158.

38. *Grub mtha' chen mo*, Section Ca, 41b-1, ff. I verified that there were two textual / corruptions in this passage by consulting Vajragarbha's commentary (the *Hevajrapañḍārthāṅkā*) in the Narthang edition of the Tanjur (at Columbia University), *Rgyud 'grel*, Vol. Ba, f. 12b-2,3, and translating accordingly.

5. The three examinations and *antarvyāpti*.

In the foregoing considerations, I have utilized studies based on Asaṅga's « Rules of Debate » and Tsoñ-kha-pa's « Guided Tour ». It seems appropriate to finish these illustrations by citing the third text of my research, Kamalaśīla's *Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣaṣaṅkṣipti*. The passage to be given was already presented in part by Stcherbatsky in his own manner in *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 76-77. Kamalaśīla cites a verse attributed to the Buddha³⁹:

Monks, just as experts examine gold by heating, cutting, and rubbing, so is my teaching to be accepted, but not out of respect (for me).

Kamalaśīla is going to claim that this verse justifies the position of the Buddhist logicians beginning with Dignāga that there are two and only two independent authorities, direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). However, Kamalaśīla is not content to claim in the usual manner of commentators who simply say a passage means so-and-so and provide no reason for the explanation. Since the claim has to do with fundamental theories of the Buddhist logicians, Kamalaśīla apparently feels that he has to be « logical » about it and go through motions of « proving » a thesis. Thus he continues⁴⁰:

This passage verbally directs only to the characteristics of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), because it verbally directs the examining by way of example, etc.; because the example of direct perception is shown as a similar case (*sapakṣa*) to heating; because that of inference is shown as a similar case to rubbing. It states that the avoidance of contradiction is the examination which is a similar case to cutting, and this is also only inference.

Kamalaśīla starts with a given verse, analogous to the Indian logicians starting with a given mountain, the *pakṣa*, the place where the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) resides. He selects three spots in the verse, the heating (*pakṣa*₁), rubbing (*pakṣa*₂), and cutting (*pakṣa*₃), much as one could point to three camping sites of the mountain where careless visitors can start fires as evidenced by smoke. What is the meaning of

39. The verse is available in Sanskrit as cited in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* to Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Dvarikadas Shastri ed., Varanasi, 1968, Vol. I, p. 15:

/ tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ /
parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyam madvaco na tu gauravāt //

STCHERBATSKY, I, 77, n. says, « According to the Tibetans the passage is from the *Ghana-sūtra*, but we could not trace it ».

40. PTT, Vol. 137, p. 192-1-2, ff.: / 'dis ni mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa'i mtshan ſiīd rnam pa gñis kho na žal gyi bzes pa yin te / dpe la sogs pas yoñs su brtag par žal gyis bzes pa'i phyir ro / mñon sum gyi dpe ni bsreg pa dañ chos mthun par bstan pa'i phyir ro / rjes su dpag pa'i ni bdar ba dañ chos mthun par bstan pa'i phyir ro / phan tshun du mi 'gal ba ni gcad pa dañ chos mthun par yoñs su brtag par gsuñs te / de yañ rjes su dpag pa kho na yin no /.

the word *pakṣa* here⁴¹? H. Kitagawa⁴² gives three meanings for *pakṣa*:

- 1) a proposition amounting to the first member of an Indian syllogism;
- 2) the fact asserted in this proposition; 3) its subject matter. Kamalaśīla here employs the third meaning — the subject matter, which Kitagawa points out as not to be identified with the Aristotelean minor term.

Kamalaśīla states a thesis: « This passage verbally directs only to the characteristics of direct perception and [= 'or'] inference ». And states the first form of reason: « because it verbally directs the examining by way of example, etc. ». He then mentions three « similar cases » (*sapakṣa*), which to qualify as « similar cases » must be individual given things that possess the thesis, as do the given examples. Thus he expands the reason with mention of these similar cases, where the example « direct perception » is a similar case to the example « heating »; the example « inference » is a similar case to the example « rubbing ». Then, while stating that the example « inference » is also a similar case to the example « cutting », he asserts that this « inference » example is the sort that avoids contradiction — which is his way (whether or not convincing) of showing absence in dissimilar cases (the *vipakṣa*). But the meaning of « similar » must be clarified, so Kamalaśīla continues⁴³:

Accordingly, the meaning is of three kinds: — *pratyakṣa*, *parokṣa*, *atyanta-parokṣa*. Here the meaning of the sūtra passage that « direct perception » is like the heating of gold amounts to the examination with direct perception. The meaning that « beyond sight » (*parokṣa*) is like the rubbing amounts to the examination with inference. The meaning of the passage « further beyond sight » (*atyanta-parokṣa*) is like cutting the gold amounts to the examination by way of avoiding contradiction. Accordingly, the pure scripture is an object (*viṣaya*) that is « [further] beyond sight » ([*atyanta-*] *parokṣa*) because it engages the masters (*āpta*)⁴⁴ in the manner of the autho-

41. See J. F. STAAL, « The Concept of *Pakṣa* in Indian Logic », *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 2, 1973, 156-166.

42. Hidenori KITAGAWA, « A Note on the Methodology in the Study of Indian Logic », *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Tokyo, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Jan., 1960, pp. 23 to 24.

43. PTT, Vol. 137, p. 192-1-4, ff.: / 'di ltar don ni rnam pa gsum ste / mñon sum dañ / lkog tu gyur pa dañ / śin tu lkog tu gyur pa'o / de la bka'i don mñon sum la ni sreg pas gser bzin du mñon sum gyis brtags yin no / don lkog tu gyur pa la bdar ba bzin du rjes su dpag pas brtags pa yin no / de fiid kyi don śin tu lkog tu gyur pa la ni gcad gser bzin du phan tshun mi 'gal ba'i sgo nas brtag pa yin te / de ltar yoñs su dag pa'i luñ la ni yul lkog tu gyur kyañ / rtog pa dañ ldan pa tshad ma yin par yid ches pa rnams 'jug pa'i phyir ro /.

44. For the « *āpta* » as the discoverer or discloser of the system, cf. MADELEINE BIARDEAU, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique*, Paris, 1964, pp. 117-128. See also the explanation of « *āpta* » as authorities, trustworthy persons, in *Caraka Saṃhitā* translated by R. K. SHARMA and BHAGWAN DASH, Vol. I, Varanasi, 1976, pp. 210-211.

rity (*pramāṇa*) that is accompanied with discursive thought (*kalpana*)⁴⁵.

Here he intends that « direct perception » is like heating the gold in the sense of a surface glimpse. That « inference » of the « beyond sight » is like rubbing the gold in the sense of considering something just below the surface. That « inference » of the « further beyond sight » is like cutting the gold in the sense of testing whether a deep layer would show something alien to gold, i.e. whether there is only a superficial layer of gold.

Stcherbatsky (I, p. 77) translated the three terms, *pratyakṣa*, *parokṣa*, and *atyanta-parokṣa* in terms of objects — the present, the absent, and the transcendental. He went on to ascribe to Kamalaśīla's little treatise the identification of the Buddhist scriptures with the third object, the « transcendental ». The discussion of the same matter in the « Guided Tour » shows that Stcherbatsky is right. Therefore, I corrected the Peking edition of the Tanjur by adding the « further » to « [further] beyond sight », as above.

Having gone through Kamalaśīla's presentation of the verse with commentary and having *en passant* added comments, it is now possible for me to take another look at what he has been doing. Note that his various examples of direct perception and inference are by him carefully called « similar cases » (*sapakṣa*). They are all part of the reason (*hetu*) to justify his stated thesis. Therefore, he did not furnish any illustration (*dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa*) as a further syllogism member, that is, beyond the thing to prove (*sādhya*) and reason (*hetu*). We are forced to the surprising conclusion that Kamalaśīla has resorted to « inner pervasion » (*antarvyāpti*). The essential element is his explanation of the « cutting » (*pakṣa*) as the inference avoiding contradiction, thus the incompatibility with the contradictory. This *antarvyāpti* was espoused by the Jaina logicians and later on (11th cent.) enthusiastically by the Buddhist Ratnākaraśānti. It is opposed to the Naiyāyikas who espouse « external pervasion » (*bahirvyāpti*), i.e. that the logical « pervasion » is established somewhere else than the *pakṣa* — thus in the event of the *pakṣa* being the mountain (the place of the smoke and fire), established in the kitchen⁴⁶. Mookerjee⁴⁷ claims that the doctrine of *antarvyāpti* was created by the Jaina logicians and promoted especially from sixth to twelfth

45. The point is that the Buddhist scripture is not assigned a separate *pramāṇa* in the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school, because it is included in a type of inference (*anumāna*) accompanied by *kalpanā*. In Asaṅga's « Rules of Debate », *āptāgama* (the lineage of the masters) is a third « authority » (*pramāṇa*) after *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.

46. But see the qualifications to employment of the example or illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*, *udāharaṇa*) in MADELEINE BIARDEAU, « Le rôle de l'exemple dans l'inférence indienne », *Journal Asiatique*, 1957, pp. 233-240.

47. SATKARI MOOKERJEE, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, University of Calcutta, 1935, p. 398.

centuries, and adds: « Śāntarakṣita has made frantic attempts to refute this doctrine and this was natural and inevitable, because the doctrine is, we have seen, antagonistic to the doctrine of triple probans and the fallacy of the uncommon inconclusive reason, propounded by Dignāga ». But a perusal of the Anumāna chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* by Śāntarakṣita with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, in which these authors first state the argument advanced by the Jaina logician Pātrasvāmin and then repulse it, does not show a quarrel between the espousers of *antarvyāpti* and *bahirvyāpti*. This is because, as Mookerjee properly observes, Pātrasvāmin rejects the Buddhist logician's requirement of a triple characteristic of evidence, to wit, the *pakṣadharmā*, *anvaya*, and *vyātireka*, and claims that once needs only one characteristic, the « invalid otherwise » (*anyathā-anupapannatva*), *Tattvasaṃgraha* verse 1364. Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* and commentarial expansion explain the *anvaya* and *vyātireka* respectively as the pervasion (*vyāpti*) with *sa-pakṣa* and *vi-pakṣa*. Mookerjee may have been misled by *Tattvasaṃgraha* verse 1370 (Shastri edition) in which Pātrasvāmin's « one characteristic » is said to be a reason free from the two examples (*hetur dṛṣṭāntadvayavarjitah*). We may assume that Pātrasvāmin refers to the *sa-pakṣa* and *vi-pakṣa* as « examples » (*dṛṣṭānta*). This is, however, a misrepresentation of the Buddhist logician's position, since for him the *sa-pakṣa* and *vi-pakṣa* characterize the reason (*hetu*), and this reason must precede the statement of the example (*dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa*). Thus, when Kamalaśīla in the previous passage alludes to three « similar cases » (*sa-pakṣa*) he intends these in the literal meaning of *sapakṣa* (co-residence), meaning that the three reside in the verse attributed to the Buddha by virtue of similitude to the *pakṣa*₁, *pakṣa*₂, and *pakṣa*₃ of that verse. So the quarrel with Pātrasvāmin is not essentially over the external illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*). It is necessary to explain these matters, for it would be strange indeed to find Kamalaśīla supporting Śāntarakṣita against this *antarvyāpti* theory, and then himself espousing this theory in another work. In the final analysis we shall have to let Kamalaśīla's formulation speak for itself.